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Starting in December 2009, small companies classified as non-accelerated filers must obtain an 
internal control audit to comply with Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. This study 
estimates the cost of the internal control audit for new accelerated filers in 2006 and 2007 and 
assesses whether the new internal control auditing standard, Auditing Standard No. 5, has 
reduced Section 404-related audit costs. The study finds that the median cost of the internal 
control audit as a percentage of total audit fees is 42% for new accelerated filers in 2006 and 
37% in 2007. This suggests that Section 404-related audit costs have fallen modestly since 
Auditing Standard No. 5 was adopted, although the change is not statistically significant. The 
2007 results provide a reasonable estimate of what non-accelerated filers will have to pay when 
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Data Availability: Data used in this study are from Compustat, Audit Analytics, and Edgar. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 When Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was enacted, regulators imposed 
different compliance deadlines for large and small companies due to concerns that the 
compliance costs would be financially burdensome to small companies. The large 
companies designated as accelerated filers began complying with Section 404 in 2004. 
Higher-than-expected Section 404 compliance costs led regulators to repeatedly extend 
the compliance deadline for non-accelerated filers, defined as companies with public 
float1 of less the $75 million.2, 3 On December 15, 2009 the non-accelerated filers are 
scheduled to begin complying with the audit requirement of Section 404. The purpose of 
the research is to estimate the cost of the Section 404 audit for new accelerated filers in 
2006 and 2007 and assess whether the new internal control auditing standard, Auditing 
Standard No. 5, has reduced Section 404-related audit costs. The 2007 results provide a 
reasonable estimate of what non-accelerated filers will have to pay when they comply. 
Section 404 is the most controversial and costly part of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 
To comply with Section 404 managers must provide an internal assessment of the 
company’s internal control over financial reporting. The company’s independent auditor 
must then attest to the effectiveness of its client’s internal control over financial 
                                                 
1 Public float is the value of a company’s shares held by the public rather than by officers, directors, and 
others that have a controlling interest in the company. 
2 While the $75 million public float is the major criterion for an accelerated filer, there are several other 
criteria. According to SEC Release no. 33-8128 (September 5, 2002) a company is an accelerated filer if it 
meets the following conditions: 1) its common equity public float was $75 million or more as of the last 
business day of its most recently completed second fiscal quarter; 2) the company has been subject to the 
reporting requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Exchange Act for a period of at least 12 calendar 
months; 3) the company has previously filed at least one annual report pursuant to Section 13(a) or 15(d) of 
the Exchange Act;  and 4) the company is not eligible to use Forms 10-KSB and 10-QSB. 
3 To put the $75 million cut-off for public float into perspective, at the end of the second quarter of 2008, 
Microsoft Corp. had public float of $288 billion, 1-800-Flowers.com, Inc. had public float of $227 million, 
and Caribou Coffee Company, Inc. had public float of $51 million.  
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reporting.4 Surveys indicate that the 2004 Section 404 compliance costs were twenty 
times higher than originally estimated by the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) (Atkins 2006). Compliance costs have been high for both the management 
assessment of internal control over financial reporting and the independent audit 
requirement (Sneller and Langendijk 2007).  
This study is concerned with the compliance costs stemming from the 
independent audit requirement of Section 404, hereafter referred to as the Section 404 
audit fee premium. The Section 404 audit fee premium was 50% on average for the 
accelerated filers that complied in 2004 (CRA International 2006; Eldridge and Kealey 
2005; Financial Executives International 2006; Iliev 2008). This implies that in the first 
year of compliance, the internal control audit caused audit fees to double on average. For 
companies that have already complied with Section 404, the cost burden has been higher 
for small companies. Krishnan et al. (2008) find that the audit costs associated with 
Section 404 increase in client assets, but that the total costs relative to assets are lower for 
larger firms. This indicates economies of scale in firm size in the internal control audit. 
 To reduce the cost of the internal control audit, the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board (PCAOB) issued Auditing Standard No. 5 in May 2007 and the SEC 
introduced related interpretive guidance in June 2007. The original standard, Auditing 
Standard No. 2, is recognized as contributing to the higher-than-expected compliance 
costs (Atkins 2006).  
Our study estimates the Section 404 audit fee premium for new accelerated filers 
in 2006 and 2007 and assesses whether the premium fell in 2007 after Auditing Standard 
                                                 
4 The non-accelerated filers began complying with the internal management assessment requirement for 
fiscal year ending on or after December 15, 2008. 
 3 
 
No. 5 was adopted. The study makes three contributions. First, estimating the Section 404 
audit fee premium for new accelerated filers in 2007 provides the best estimate of the 
expected audit fee premium of the non-accelerated filers when they have to begin 
complying in December 2009. This will inform policy makers about the regulatory costs 
for the non-accelerated filers and could assist in the decision of whether to extend the 
compliance deadline again or alter the requirements for compliance. This is an important 
policy decision because small firms are responsible for considerable job growth and 
innovation in the economy. Because there are economies of scale in the Section 404 audit 
fee premium, these compliance costs are more burdensome for small firms than for large 
firms. An important issue to consider is whether the Section 404 audit fee premium could 
financially weaken the non-accelerated filers.  
Second, we assess whether the Section 404 audit fee premium declined after the 
adoption of the new internal control auditing standard, Auditing Standard No. 5. While 
the purpose of the standard is to induce auditors to adopt more efficient procedures for 
conducting the internal control audit, it is uncertain whether the new standard has had a 
substantive effect on audit costs. Auditors may be so concerned about potential 
shareholder lawsuits that they will continue the conservative, less efficient approach. 
Even if Auditing Standard No. 5 does change the way internal control audits are 
conducted, the magnitude of the change could be small, resulting in a minimal reduction 
in audit costs.  
The third contribution of the study is that it will help indirectly assess the increase 
in the audit firm resources required to perform Section 404 audits for non-accelerated 
filers. When Section 404 was implemented in 2004, increased demand for Section 404-
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related audit services increased the use of audit resources. Since accelerated filers 
comprised a large fraction of Big 4 clients, and the Big 4 could not expand quickly 
enough to accommodate the increase in demand, this precipitated a large increase in 
switching from Big 4 auditors to smaller auditors (Jean 2004; Sullivan 2007). If the 
resource requirements to perform a new Section 404 audit remain high, this could disrupt 
the audit industry when all the non-accelerated filers are required to obtain this audit 
within a short period of time. In 2007, 75% of the non-accelerated filers in our sample 
were audited by non-Big 4 auditors. An important question is whether these non-Big 4 
auditors will be able to expand quickly enough to perform Section 404 audits for the non-
accelerated filers.    
We estimate the Section 404 audit fee premium using archival data. The audit fees 
reported by companies in regulatory filings combine the costs stemming from both the 
financial statement audit and the internal control audit. The Section 404 audit fee 
premium must be estimated because companies do not identify the portion of their total 
audit fees attributable to the internal control audit. In theory, the Section 404 premium is 
the total audit fee paid by an accelerated filer minus the fee the firm would have paid had 
it remained a non-accelerated filer and, hence, not obtained an internal control audit. In 
reality, we do not observe the audit fee the accelerated filer would have paid had it 
remained a non-accelerated filer therefore we must estimate it. We use the estimates from 
an audit fee regression model for non-accelerated filers to estimate the hypothetical audit 
fee an accelerated filer would have paid had it remained non-accelerated filer.  
Two methodological issues must be addressed in estimating the Section 404 
premium, both due to the non-random selection process for accelerated filers. First, the 
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$75 million public float threshold for accelerated filers causes new accelerated filers to be 
larger on average than non-accelerated filers and differ with respect to other audit fee 
determinants. Unless this problem is corrected, the estimated parameters from the non-
accelerated filer fee regression would provide biased estimates of the hypothetical audit 
fees accelerated filers would have paid as non-accelerated filers. This, in turn, would 
result in a biased estimate of the Section 404 audit fee premium. We use propensity score 
matching to create a sample in which the accelerated filers and non-accelerated filers are 
similar with respect to observable characteristics. Propensity score matching has been 
used in accounting (Doyle et al. 2007; Francis and Lennox 2008), labor economics 
(Dehejia and Wahba 1999; Heckman et al. 1997), and finance (Colak and Whited 2006; 
Li and Zhao 2006; Villalonga 2004 ). 
In addition, some firms may have systematically taken unobservable actions to 
avoid accelerated filer status, resulting in selection bias. Selection bias may occur if the 
firms that avoid accelerated filer status would have paid more for the Section 404 audit 
than the firms that actually complied. To determine whether self-selection bias results 
from avoidance, we use the Heckman procedure, which involves estimating the inverse 
Mills ratios from a first-stage probit model and including them as determinants in the 
audit fee regressions (Chaney et al. 2004; Francis and Lennox 2008).  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background on 
Section 404 and reviews studies of the Section 404 audit fee premium. Section 3 
describes the methodology. The data and sample are described in Section 4. Section 5 







II.  BACKGROUND 
 
In response to the Enron and other accounting scandals, the U.S. Congress passed 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX). The purpose of SOX is to restore investor 
confidence to the market by improving the reliability of accounting information reported 
to investors. Section 404 requires publicly-held companies to identify risks to the 
company’s financial reporting system and to develop internal controls that address these 
risks. Internal controls include a wide range of activities designed to prevent fraudulent 
and misleading financial reporting and to safeguard revenues and assets.   
 When Section 404 compliance costs proved to be much high than expected, the 
PCAOB conducted a study of the original auditing standard for internal control over 
financial reporting, Auditing Standard No. 2, to determine how the internal control audit 
costs might be reduced. The study found several problems with the way the standard was 
implemented. Auditors tended to perform detailed tests of a great number of controls 
without regard to their risk or importance. In addition, some auditors did not use the work 
of others in circumstances where this was permitted. Finally, auditors did not always 
integrate the internal control audit with the audit of financial statements (Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board 2005). 
 The new standard, Auditing Standard No. 5, takes a risk-based approach, focusing 
on the most important controls rather than treating each control in a uniform manner. 
Auditing Standard No. 5 emphasizes risk and materiality rather than routine evaluation of 
all controls. The new standard makes the audit “scalable” so that it can be adapted to 
smaller, less complex companies. It also allows the auditor to rely more on the work of 
 7 
 
others, which should reduce the external auditor cost and eliminate duplication (Cox 
2007).  
Our study is the first to provide an estimate of the expected Section 404 audit fee 
premium for non-accelerated filers and to assess the effect of Auditing Standard No. 5 on 
this premium. Several features of the study are designed to address these objectives. First, 
the sample consists of small companies, similar in size to non-accelerated filers. Second, 
the accelerated filers in the sample are new accelerated filers, complying with Section 
404 for the first time. Third, the 2007 sample includes only accelerated filers that used 
Auditing Standard No. 5 for their internal control audit that year, permitting a comparison 
of the Auditing Standard No. 2 audits in 2006.  
As mentioned in the introduction, early studies find that the Section 404 audit fee 
premium is about 50% of total audit fees in 2004, the first year of compliance. 
Subsequent studies suggest that these costs have fallen over time. Estimates of the 
Section 404 audit fee premium during the second year of compliance are 41% of total 
audit fees (CRA International 2006) and 45% of total audit fees (Financial Executives 
International 2006). For 2006, the first year of our study, the Financial Executives 
International (FEI) survey estimates that the Section 404 audit fee premium had fallen to 
27.5% of total audit fees (Sinnett 2007), a large drop from its estimate from the previous 
year of 45%. The FEI survey for 2007 estimates the Section 404 audit fee premium as 
23.7% of total audit fees (Financial Executives International 2008).  
The cost reductions estimated by these studies will not necessarily be realized by 
first-time accelerated filers because the surveys on which the studies are based include 
seasoned accelerated filers—companies that became accelerated filers prior to the survey 
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period. If the observed reductions in the cost of the Section 404 audit stem from client-
specific learning effects—learning that results from conducting the internal control audit 
repeatedly for a specific client—then first-time accelerated filers may not benefit from 
them. Alternatively, if the cost reductions are attributable to the auditors’ general learning 
about Section 404 audits, they would apply to any client, including first-time accelerated 
filers. Since our samples do not include seasoned accelerated filers, our estimates will not 
erroneously capture client-specific learning affects that stem from performing an internal 
control audit repeatedly for the same client.  
In addition, the estimates from other studies are based on firms that are much 
larger on average than non-accelerated filers. For FEI’s survey of 2006 costs, the 
respondents had average annual revenues of $6.8 billion (Financial Executives 
International 2007); for its survey of 2007 costs, the respondents had average annual 
revenues of $4.7 billion (Financial Executives International 2008). In contrast, the mean 
sales for the firms in our samples are $120 million in 2006 and $100 million in 2007. The 
Section 404 audit fee premia are unlikely to be the same for firms so different in size.   
At this time no studies have been conducted to assess whether Auditing Standard 
No. 5 has reduced Section 404 compliance costs. While FEI conducted surveys in both 
2006 and 2007, it is not clear whether all of the accelerated filers in their 2007 sample 
had been audited with Auditing Standard No. 5, since the new standard only became 
mandatory on November 15 of that year. The SEC is currently conducting a study of the 
compliance costs associated with Section 404, in part to examine the effect of Auditing 
Standard No. 5 (Burns 2007), but the results are not yet known. 
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 Existing studies of the Section 404 audit fee premium have been based on either 
expert assessments or archival data. Surveys and self-reported data rely on expert 
assessments of the portion of the premium.  
 For the first year after Section 404 was implemented, a small number of firms 
voluntarily reported their Section 404 compliance costs. Eldridge and Kealey (2005) and 
Krishnan et al. (2008) used this self-reported data to examine the Section 404 audit fee 
premium. Numerous studies have employed surveys to estimate the Section 404 audit fee 
premium. The FEI studies are based on surveys of public companies.5 The CRA 
International studies are based on a survey of the Big 4 accounting firms on their clients’ 
Section 404 implementation costs. 6  
 Self-reported data and survey data rely on judgment in determining the portion of 
the audit fee attributable to Section 404. Since there are joint costs of performing the 
financial statement audit and the Section 404 audit, someone must decide how to allocate 
the joint costs to the two types of audits, which is not always a straightforward task. 
Survey responses can also be influenced by halo effects whereby a person’s attitude 
toward the survey topic affects the responses to all the questions (Beckwith and Lehmann 
1975). For example, in our application someone who is unfavorably disposed to Section 
404 may overstate the fraction of the audit fee attributable to Section 404, leading to an 
upward biased estimate. One advantage of using archival data to estimate the Section 404 
audit fee premium is that it does not require use of judgment. Surveys can also suffer 
                                                 
5 The FEI web site contains a list of the surveys conducted on Section 404 compliance costs: 
http://www.financialexecutives.org/eweb/DynamicPage.aspx?site=_fei&webcode=ad
v_sox 
6 These studies were commissioned by the Big 4 accounting firms. 
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from response bias when the companies that choose to report Section 404 compliance 
costs are not randomly selected (Krishnan et al. 2008).  
 Two studies that use archival data to estimate Section 404 audit fee premium are 
Raghunandan and Rama (2006) and Iliev (2008). Raghunandan and Rama (2006) use 
audit fees from Audit Analytics for a sample of manufacturing firms in 2004. By 
comparing the 2004 total audit fees to the 2003 total audit fees, the study finds that 
internal control weaknesses have a positive effect on audit fees.  
To estimate the Section 404 premium with archival data, Iliev (2008) compares 
the audit fees of the 2004 accelerated filers with the fees of the non-accelerated filers in 
that year. Iliev uses regression discontinuity analysis to reduce the bias from the non-
random selection process that causes the accelerated filers to be larger than the non-
accelerated filers. To implement the regression discontinuity analysis, he restricts the 
sample to firms with public float between $50 million and $100 million, with $75 million 
being the cutoff for complying with Section 404. One disadvantage of this method is that 
restricting the sample to firms in the $50 million - $100 million range of public float 
reduces the sample size. This is not a serious concern for Iliev’s analysis because many 
firms became accelerated filers in 2004. However, since 2004, a relatively small number 
of firms have become accelerated filers each year. Restricting the 2006 and 2007 samples 
to firms with public float between $50 million and $100 million would result in sample 
that is unreasonably small for the purpose of estimation.   
 
III.   DEVELOPMENT OF METHODOLOGY 
 
 Our estimate of the Section 404 audit fee premium for firm i, a new accelerated 
filer, equals the actual audit fee paid by firm i minus the expected fee firm i would have 
 11 
 
paid had it remained a non-accelerated filer and, hence, not obtained an internal control 
audit: FeeA,i - E(FeeNA,i), where A represents new accelerated filers and NA represents 
non-accelerated filers. To estimate E(FeeNA,i), we use the estimated parameters from the 
non-accelerated filer audit fee regression to compute the predicted audit fee with the 
accelerated filer’s characteristics.  
As mentioned in the introduction, firms are not randomly selected into accelerated 
filer status and this leads to two problems that must be addressed by the estimation 
methodology. First, the regulatory criteria dictating which firms become accelerated filers 
cause the accelerated filers to be larger than non-accelerated filers and differ with respect 
to other observable characteristics. Unless this problem is corrected, the benchmark audit 
fee estimated using non-accelerated filer parameters will provide a biased estimate of 
E(FeeNA,i), the audit fee that an accelerated filer would have paid absent the Section 404 
audit (Heckman et al. 1997). This in turn would result in a biased estimate of the Section 
404 audit fee premium. We use propensity score matching to create a sample in which 
new accelerated filers are matched with non-accelerated filers with similar observable 
characteristics. The propensity score is the probability of being an accelerated filer as a 
function of observable characteristics. Propensity score matching reduces the 
dimensionality of the problem because instead of matching the two classes of firms on all 
of the observable characteristics, it is sufficient to match them on the basis of estimated 
propensity scores (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983). This eliminates the bias from the two 
classes of firms having different characteristics (Heckman and Navarro-Lozano 2004). In 
accounting, Doyle et al. (2007) use propensity score matching to estimate the relation 
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between accruals quality and weaknesses and Francis and Lennox (2008), to estimate the 
Big 4 audit fee premium. 
The second selection issue that arises is that firms may have self-selected into 
non-accelerated filer status by taking actions to prevent their public float from reaching 
the $75 million threshold. Some of these actions are observable. For example, firms could 
avoid accelerated filer status by buying back their shares to reduce their public float. 
Observable actions can be controlled for in the propensity score model and, therefore, 
will not result in a biased estimate of the Section 404 audit fee premium. However, some 
of the actions may not be observable, such as deciding not to expand when expansion is 
optimal. If the expected Section 404 audit fee premium is higher for firms that avoid 
accelerated filer status than for those that become accelerated filers, and unobservable 
factors affect the decision to avoid, then the estimated Section 404 audit fee premium will 
be downward biased. In this case the estimated premium would be lower than the 
premium based on a sample in which firms are randomly selected into accelerated filer 
status. 
To address the possibility that self-selection bias results from avoidance, we 
estimate inverse Mills ratios and include them as determinants in the audit fee regressions 
(Chaney et al. 2004; Francis and Lennox 2008).  We estimate separate audit fee 
regressions for accelerated filers and non-accelerated filers using the matched samples 
created from propensity score matching.  
Estimating the Propensity Scores and Computing the Inverse Mills Ratios   
 We use the following probit model to estimate the probability that a firm is an 
accelerated filer based on observable characteristics.  We use the results for two 
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purposes, to compute the propensity scores and to estimate the inverse Mills ratios that 
are used in the audit fee regressions.  
Acflrit = β0 + β1LnFeeit-1 + β2LnAssetsit + β3SqSegmentsit + β4Foreignit + β5InvRecit  
+ β6Big4it + β7Initialit + β8Roait + β9Lossit + β10Liquidityit + β11Cashit-1                      (1) 
+ β12NewDebtit-1 + β13Risk it-1 + β14NewStockit-1 + β15Growthit-1 + β16LnFloatit-1  + ξ             
where i represents firm i and t indicates year t.  
 The dependent variable, Acflrit, is an indicator variable that equals 1 if firm i 
becomes an accelerated filer in year t and equals zero if firm i remains a non-accelerated 
filer.  
 The determinants of the propensity score model include audit fee determinants, 
factors that may be related to avoidance efforts, and other factors that may affect 
accelerated filer status. Since the outcome of interest is audit fees, it is necessary to 
include audit fee determinants in the propensity score model because this helps to match 
accelerated filers and non-accelerated filers on the basis of these audit fee determinants. 
Therefore we include the following audit fee determinants as covariates.7 LnAssetsit is the 
natural log of total assets, SqSegmentsit is the square root of the number of geographic 
segments, Foreignit is a measure of foreign activity, and InvRecit equals inventories plus 
accounts receivables divided by total assets. These factors are related to the size and 
complexity of the firm. Initialit indicates whether the firm is in the initial year of an audit 
engagement and is included to control for low-balling. Big4it indicates whether a firm is 
audited by a Big 4 auditor. Roait is operating income divided by total assets. Lossit 
indicates whether the firm experienced a loss in the current or previous years. Liquidityit 
                                                 
7 These determinants are based on studies of audit fees (Craswell, Francis and Taylor 1995; Palmrose 1986; 
Simunic 1980; Whisenant et al. 2003). 
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is the ratio of current assets to current liabilities. The log of the previous year’s audit fee, 
LnFeeit-1, is included to control for omitted firm-specific factors that affect audit fees.   
 We include several factors in the probit model that may be associated with the 
avoidance of accelerated filer status. Since avoidance attempts would likely have 
occurred prior to the filing year t, these variables are measured in year t-1. An obvious 
variable to include to detect avoidance is a firm’s repurchase of common stock. A firm 
can avoid accelerated filer status by repurchasing its common stock to lower its public 
float to below the $75 million cutoff. Unfortunately, for each year of our analysis, only 
one firm – a non-accelerated filer in each case – repurchased common stock. Technically 
one cannot include a variable that is perfectly correlated with one outcome in a probit 
model, so this variable cannot be included in the analysis. Moreover, a lone non-
accelerated filer repurchasing stock does not provide evidence of systematic avoidance of 
accelerated filer status. 
 There are no direct measures indicating whether a firm decided not to issue new 
stock to avoid accelerated filer status. We include two variables to proxy for a firm’s 
decision not to issue new stock. The variable Cashit-1 is a measure of a firm’s ability to 
forego the issuing of new stock. A firm with high cash reserves is in a better position to 
maintain its current operation without issuing new stock. Dittmar (2000) finds that cash is 
positively related to a firm’s decision to buy back its stock. A negative sign for Cashit-1 
would be consistent with avoidance of accelerated filer status. In addition, a company 
avoiding accelerated filer status may decide to obtain new financing by issuing debt 
rather than stock. We include NewDebtit-1, which is equal to 1 if the firm issues new debt. 
If debt financing is used as an alternative to issuing stock for the purpose of keeping the 
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public float below the $75 million threshold, then NewDebtit-1 should be negatively 
associated with becoming an accelerated filer.  
 Krishnan et al. (2008) find evidence that companies with internal control 
weaknesses pay a higher Section 404 audit fee premium. Therefore a company may be 
more likely to avoid accelerated filer status if it believes it will have internal control 
weaknesses. Ge and McVay (2005) find that internal control weaknesses are more 
prevalent in high-litigation risk industries. As a proxy for internal control weaknesses we 
include Riskit-1, an indicator variable for high-litigation risk industries.  
 We also include control variables that may affect the probability of becoming an 
accelerated filer in year t. Since increasing common stock can increase public float, 
NewStockit-1 should increase the likelihood of becoming an accelerated filer. We also 
control for sales growth, Growthit-1 and the log of float in t-1, LnFloatit-1   because firms 
that are growing and firms with large prior-year float are more likely to become 
accelerated filers.  
 The propensity scores are the predicted probabilities of being an accelerated filer 
based on the results of the probit model estimation. Each accelerated filer is matched to 
the non-accelerated filer with the closest propensity score. Only the firms in the common 
support are included in the matching procedure. The common support includes non-
accelerated filers and accelerated filers with overlapping propensity scores. Non-
accelerated filers with propensity scores lower than the lowest propensity score of the 
accelerated filers are not in the common support, nor are accelerated filers with 
propensity scores greater than the highest propensity score of the non-accelerated filers. 
Matching only firms in the common support improves the closeness of the matching.    
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 We also use the estimates from model (1) to compute the inverse Mills ratios 
IMRA for the new accelerated filers and IMRNA for the non-accelerated filers.  
 After creating matched samples with the propensity scores, we used the matched 
samples to estimate the second-stage audit fee regressions, which include the inverse 
Mills ratios as explanatory variables: 
LnFeeit = α0j + α1jLnFeeit-1 + α2jLnAssetsit + α3jSqSegmentsit  + α4jForeignit  
+  α5jInvRecit + α6jBig4it + α7jInitialit + α8jRoait  + α9jLossit + α10jLiquidityit   
+ α11jIMRijt + εit                                       (2) 
where i represents firm i,  j = A for new accelerated filers, j = NA for non-accelerated filers, and 
t indicates year t. The estimated coefficients have j subscripts because the audit fee regressions 
are estimated separately for new accelerated filers and non-accelerated filers, resulting in 
different estimated coefficients and intercepts for the two filer types.  
 Unobservable factors stemming from avoidance attempts should be reflected in 
the estimated coefficient for the inverse Mills ratio in the accelerated filer audit fee 
regression. Specifically, avoidance would be consistent with a negative estimated 
coefficient α11A in the accelerated filer regression. A negative α11A would mean that the 
new accelerated filers in the sample paid lower fees than a randomly-selected group of 
firms would have paid had they been accelerated filers. Such a finding would imply that 
on average, the non-accelerated filers in the sample would have paid higher fees had they 
obtained the Section 404 audit than the accelerated filers actually paid.  
 We then use the estimated parameters from the non-accelerated filer audit fee 
regression to compute the expected fee that firm i, an accelerated filer, would have paid 




IV. DATA AND SAMPLE 
 
 We create samples to estimate the Section 404 audit fee premium for first-time 
accelerated filers in 2006 and 2007. The samples consist of all firms that were non-
accelerated filers in year t-1. Non-accelerated filers in year t-1 became first-time 
accelerated filers in year t if they met the accelerated filer criteria by the end of the 
second quarter of year t. 
 We omit non-accelerated filers with prior-year public float of $75 million or 
greater. These firms had reached the accelerated filer size criterion prior to year t but 
were exempt from accelerated filer status because they had only recently become public 
companies.8  Including these relatively large companies would result in an estimated 
Section 404 audit fee premium that is not representative of the smaller firms that are the 
focus of this study. We also omit firms that had previously been accelerated filers and 
reverted to non-accelerated filer status. These firms are different than non-accelerated 
filers that have never complied with Section 404.  
 The samples include all firms classified as non-accelerated filers by Audit 
Analytics in all years prior to the year of the analysis. Banks and other financial firms 
(SIC 6000-6999) have fundamentally different operating characteristics so we omit them 
from the sample. Moreover, firms in finance-related industries adopted internal control 
procedures similar to those mandated by Section 404 in the early 1990s,9 so they may 
have lower costs of complying with Section 404 than firms in other industries. We also 
omit firms with missing Audit Analytics and Compustat variables. For this reduced 
sample we hand collect prior-year public float from 10-K reports in the SEC’s Edgar 
                                                 
8 See footnote 2 of the introduction for a list of criteria for being an accelerated filer. 
9 The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act was enacted in 1992.  
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database. Firms for which prior-year public float is not available are omitted from the 
sample.  
 For the 2007 data set, we omit accelerated filers that were audited with Auditing 
Standard No. 2. This provides a clean basis for comparison with the 2006 sample, for 
which all the accelerated filers used Auditing Standard No. 2. Firms were permitted to 
use Auditing Standard No. 5 after the SEC approved it in July 2007 and were required to 
use it when it became mandatory on November 15, 2007.  
 These sample selection criteria result in a 2006 sample with 74 accelerated filers 
and 591 non-accelerated filers. The 2007 sample has 71 accelerated filers and 406 non-
accelerated filers. The variables are defined in the Appendix.  
 Table 1 shows that for both samples, the audit fees in year t are significantly 
higher for accelerated filers than non-accelerated filers. This is expected since the 
accelerated filers’ audit fees include the Section 404 premium. However, the two classes 
of firms also differ with respect to several other variables, implying that the selection 
process for accelerated filers is not random. In both samples, accelerated filers have 
significantly higher assets, new debt financing, new stock financing, prior-year fees and 
prior-year float than the non-accelerated filers. In 2006, Losst differs for accelerated filers 
and non-accelerated filers. In 2007, the two filer types differ with respect to Big4t, Initialt, 
and Growtht-1.10    
 The correlations are provided in Table 2. Some of the correlations among the 
audit fee determinants are high, especially the correlations of LnFeet-1 and LnAssetst with 
several of the variables. This shows that it is necessary to test for multicollinearity in the 
subsequent analysis. 
                                                 






 The results of the probit model estimation are provided in Table 3. Two audit fee 
determinants have a significant effect on the probability of being an accelerated filer. 
Firms with higher assets are more likely to be accelerated filers in both years. Having a 
Big 4 auditor is negatively associated with being an accelerated filer in 2006 and 
positively associated with being an accelerated filer in 2007. The positive sign in 2007 is 
not surprising, given that only 25% of non-accelerated filers were audited by Big 4 
auditors that year versus 58% for new accelerated filers. In 2006, the Big 4 share was 
about the same for non-accelerated filers and new accelerated filers (33% versus 35%).     
 The factors included to detect avoidance either have signs that are inconsistent 
with avoidance or are statistically insignificant. Neither Casht-1 nor Riskt-1 has a 
statistically significant effect on the probability of becoming an accelerated filer in either 
sample. New debt financing is positively associated with becoming an accelerated filer, 
which is inconsistent with avoiding accelerated filer status by issuing debt as alternative 
to stock financing.  
 Each of the control variables is statistically significant in one or both years. New 
stock financing is positively related to becoming an accelerated filer in 2007, but not 
2006. The log of public float from the prior year is positively related to becoming an 
accelerated filer in both years. Growtht-1 is positively related to becoming an accelerated 
filer in 2007.  
 The estimated results of the probit model in Table 3 are used to estimate both the 
propensity scores that are used to create matched samples and the inverse Mills ratios that 
are included in the audit fee regression analysis.  
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  The estimated propensity scores are used to match the accelerated filers to non-
accelerated filers as described in Section 3. We exclude from the sample firms that are 
not in the common support, where the common support consists of non-accelerated filers 
and accelerated filers with overlapping propensity scores. In 2006, 3 of the 74 accelerated 
filers are not in the common support and in 2007, 2 of the 71 accelerated filers are not in 
the common support. That leaves 71 accelerated filers in 2006 and 69 in 2007. Each of 
the accelerated filers in the common support is matched with the non-accelerated filer 
with the closest propensity score. 
 Table 4 shows that for the 2006 matched sample, the accelerated filers do not 
differ significantly from the non-accelerated filers for any variables except LnFeet, which 
is expected since accelerated filers must pay the Section 404 audit. In 2007, the only 
variable with a mean that differs for accelerated filers and non-accelerated filers is 
Foreignt, but the difference is significant only at the 10% level. Overall the matching of 
the accelerated filers and non-accelerated filers is very close.  
 The regression results from equation (2) are provided in Table 5, with the 
accelerated filer regression results reported in Panel A and the non-accelerated filer 
regression results in Panel B. The explanatory power of the determinants is similar to 
other audit fee studies, with the adjusted R2 ranging from 0.67 to 0.84. In each regression, 
the estimated coefficient of LnFeet-1 is positive and statistically significant. The estimated 
coefficient of LnAssetst is positive and significant in the 2007 regressions for both 
accelerated filers and non-accelerated filers. Big4t is positive and significant in the 2006 
accelerated filer regression. Liquidityt has a negative significant effect in the 2007 non-
accelerated filer regression.  Each of the significant coefficients has the expected sign. 
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Several audit fee determinants are not statistically significant, probably because the 
sample sizes are small and there is limited variability in the determinants because the 
samples include only firms that were non-accelerated filers in year t-1. Nonetheless, the 
R2s indicate that explanatory power of the regressions is fairly high. Multicollinearity is 
not a problem in the regressions. The highest variance inflation factor (VIF) is 3.51 for 
LnAssetst for the 2007 accelerated filer regression. VIF is used to identify the severity of 
multicollienarity, which is regarded as high when a VIF exceeds 10 (Belsey et al. 1980; 
Greene 2008).  
 The estimated coefficient of the inverse Mills ratio is not statistically significant 
in any of the regressions. However, the estimated coefficient is negative and has a p-
value of 0.12 in the 2006 accelerated filer regression, which is close to significant at the 
10% level. This is notable, since a negative coefficient for an accelerated filer inverse 
Mills ratio is consistent with avoidance efforts by non-accelerated filers. Nonetheless, 
since the estimated coefficient is not statistically significant at conventional levels, we 
cannot interpret this estimated coefficient as consistent with avoidance.  
 The estimated Section 404 audit fee premium for firm i, a new accelerated filer, 
equals its actual audit fee minus the hypothetical fee firm i would have paid had it 
remained a non-accelerated filer: Premiumit = FeeA,it - E(FeeNA,it). To make the premium 
comparable for the two years, we compute PremShareit, the premium paid by firm i as a 
fraction of its total audit fee in year t: PremShareit = Premiumit/Feeit. 
 A summary of the estimates of PremShare is provided in Table 6. For 2006, the 
median PremShare is 0.42. This means that the Section 404 audit fee premium of the 
median new accelerated filer in 2006 was 42% of its total audit fee that year. The 25th and 
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75th percentiles of PremShare are 0.24 and 0.56, respectively. The mean PremShare is 
0.36 in 2006.  
 The results for 2007 suggest that PremShare has fallen modestly. The median 
PremShare is 0.37, down from 0.42 in 2006. The 25th and 75th percentiles of PremShare 
are also somewhat lower relative to 2006, as is the mean PremShare.   
 Further examination reveals that the reduction in PremShare in 2007 is not 
statistically significant. We conduct a t-test to determine whether the 2006 mean is higher 
than the 2007 mean and a Wilcoxon rank-sum test (z-statistic) to determine whether the 
PremShare for the two years come from different distributions. Neither the t-statistic nor 
the z-statistic is statistically significant at even the 10% level a using a 1-tailed test.    
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
 In December 2009 non-accelerated filers will have to begin complying with the 
independent audit requirement of Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Since Section 
404 was implemented in 2004, regulators have extended the compliance deadline four 
times and revised the internal control auditing standard from Auditing Standard No. 2 to 
Auditing Standard No. 5. The study has two objectives: to provide an estimate of the 
Section 404 audit fee premium that non-accelerated filers will have to pay when they 
obtain an internal control audit and to assess whether Auditing Standard No. 5 has 
succeeded in reducing the Section 404 audit fee premium.  
 The estimated audit fee premium in 2007 provided by this study is the most recent 
estimate of the Section 404 premium and is based on small firms that are first-time 
accelerated filers. Therefore it is the best estimate of what the non-accelerated filers will 
pay when they are required to obtain an internal control audit starting in December 2009. 
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The median PremShare, audit fee premium as share of total audit fee, for new accelerated 
filers in 2007 is 37% and the mean is 32%. While the premium is not trivial, it appears 
lower than the 50% PremShare that new accelerated filers paid in 2004, the first year of 
compliance. The Section 404 premium for the smallest non-accelerated filers could be 
somewhat larger as a percentage of the total audit fees than the estimates provided by this 
study since the cost of the Section 404 audit appears to exhibit economies of scale. 
 The Section 404 audit fee premium for first-time accelerated filers appears to 
have fallen somewhat in 2007, although the reduction is not statistically significant. 
Therefore this study does not find conclusive evidence that Auditing Standard No. 5 
reduced the cost of the Section 404 audit. The study finds no conclusive evidence that 
non-accelerated filers systematically avoided accelerated filer status because they 
expected their Section 404 audit fee premia to be unusually high. 
 This study makes several contributions. First, these estimates of the Section 404 
audit fee premium for first-time accelerated filers will inform policy makers about the 
regulatory costs for the non-accelerated filers that are scheduled to comply with the 
independent audit requirement of Section 404 starting December 15, 2009. Second, the 
study is the first to investigate whether the Section 404 audit fee premium fell in 2007 
after Auditing Standard No. 5 was implemented. While the study fails to show that the 
premium for new accelerated filers fell from 2006 to 2007, it is possible that the new 
standard will significantly reduce costs after auditors obtain more experience with the 
new standard. Further research is necessary to investigate the effect of the Auditing 
Standard No. 5 on audit costs. Finally, the research should be useful to the auditors of 
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non-accelerated filers in planning how much to increase their resources to perform the 





Atkins, P. 2006. Speech delivered by SEC Commissioner at American Electronics 
Association Classical Finance Conference. September 20. U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission. Accessed on November 26, 2008 at: 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2006/spch110706psa.htm. 
 
Beckwith, N., and D. Lehmann. 1975. The importance of halo effects in multi-attribute 
models. The Journal of Marketing Research 12: 265-275. 
 
Belsey, D., E. Kuh, and E. R. Welsch. 1980. Regression diagnostics: identifying 
 influential data and sources of collinearity. Wiley and Sons, New York. 
 
Burns, J. 2007. SEC seeks rules delay for small companies. Wall Street Journal 
(December 13, 2007): C4.  
 
Chaney, P., D. Jeter, and L. Shivakumar. 2004. Self-selection of auditors and audit 
pricing in private firms. The Accounting Review 79: 51-72. 
 
Cox, C. 2007. Speech delivered by SEC Chairman at Annual Meeting of Association of 
Audit Committee Members. June 1. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.   
Accessed on November 20, 2008 at:  
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch060107cc.htm. 
 
Çolak. G., and T. Whited. 2006. Spin-offs, divestitures, and conglomerate investment. 
 The Review of Financial Studies 20: 557-595.  
 
CRA International. 2006. Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404 Costs and Implementation Issues: 
Spring 2006 Survey Update. Washington, D.C.: CRA International. 
 
Craswell, A., J. Francis, and S. Taylor. 1995. Auditor brand name reputation and industry 
specializations. Journal of Accounting an Economics 20: 297-322.  
 
Dehejia, R., and S. Wahba. 1999. Causal effects in nonexperimental studies: reevaluating 
the evaluation of training programs. Journal of the American Statistical Association 
94: 1053-1062.  
 
Dittmar, A. 2000. Why do firms repurchase stock? The Journal of Business 73: 331-355. 
 
Doyle J., W Ge, and S. McVay. 2007. Accruals quality and internal control over financial 
reporting. The Accounting Review 82: 1141-1170.  
 
Eldridge, S., and B. Kealey. 2005. SOX costs: Auditor attestation under Section 404. 




Financial Executives International. 2006. Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404 Implementation 
Survey. March. Financial Executives International. Accessed on December 3, 2008 
at: http://www2.financialexecutives.org/news/404_survey_4_6_06.cfm. 
 
Financial Executives International. 2007. FEI Survey: Management Drives Sarbanes-
Oxley Compliance Costs Down by 23%, but Auditor Fees Virtually Unchanged. 
May 16. Financial Executives International. Accessed on April 30, 2008 at: 
http://fei.mediaroom.com/index.php?s=43&item=193. 
 
Financial Executives International. 2008. FEI Survey: Average 2007 SOX Compliance 
Cost $1.7 Million. April 30. Financial Executives International. Accessed on 
December 3, 2008 at: http://fei.mediaroom.com/index.php?s=43&item=204. 
 
Francis, J., and C. Lennox. 2008. Selection models in accounting research. Working 
paper, SSRN. Available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1120796. 
 
Ge, W., and S. McVay. 2005. The disclosure of material weakness in internal control 
after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Accounting Horizons 18: 137-158. 
 
Greene, W. 2008. Econometric Analysis. Upper Saddle River, N. J.: Pearson/Prentice 
 Hall. 
 
Heckman, J., H. Ichimura, and P. Todd. 1997. Matching as an econometric evaluation 
estimator: Evidence from evaluating a job training programme. The Review of 
Economic Studies 64 (Special Issue: Evaluation of Training and Other Social 
Programmes): 605-654. 
 
Heckman, J., and S. Navarro-Lozano. 2004. Using matching, instrumental variables, and 
control functions to estimate economic choice models. The Review of Economics 
and Statistics 86: 30-57. 
 
Iliev, P. 2008. The effect of the SOX Section 404 compliance on audit fees, earnings 
quality and stock prices. Working paper, The Pennsylvania State University. 
 
Jean, S. 2004. Overwhelmed accounting firms focus on big clients, leaving smaller ones 
behind. Saint Paul Pioneer Press (October 19, 2004).  
 
Krishnan, J., D. Rama, and Y. Zhang. 2008. Costs to comply with SOX Section 404. 
Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory 27: 169-186. 
 
Li, K., and N. Prabhala. 2006. Self-Selection Models in Corporate Finance. Chapter 2 
Handbook of Corporate Finance.  Edited by B.Eckbo. Elsevier.  
 
Li, X., and X. Zhao. 2006. Propensity score matching and abnormal performance after 




Maddala, G. 1983. Limited-Dependent and Qualitative Variables in Econometrics. 
Econometric Society Monographs: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Palmrose, Z. 1986. Audit fees and auditor size: Further evidence. Journal of Accounting 
Research 24: 97-110.  
 
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board. 2005. Report on the Initial 
Implementation of Auditing Standard No. 2, An Audit of Internal Control Over 
Financial Reporting Performed in Conjunction with an Audit of Financial 
Statements. PCAOB Reslease No. 2005-023. November 30. Accessed on November 
20, 2008 at:  http://www.pcaobus.org/Inspections/Other/2005/11-
30_Release_2005-023.pdf. 
 
Raghunandan, K., and D. Rama. 2006. SOX Section 404 material weaknesses disclosures 
and audit fees. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory 25: 99-114. 
 
Rosenbaum, P., and D. Rubin. 1983. The central role of the propensity score in 
observational studies for causal effects. Biometrica 70: 41-55.  
 
Simunic, D. 1980. The pricing of audit services: Theory and evidence. Journal of 
Accounting Research 18: 161-190.  
 
Sinnett, W. 2007. FEI Survey on Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404 Implementation: May 
2007. Financial Executives International.  
 
Sneller, L., and H. Langendijik. 2007. Sarbanes Oxley Section 404 costs of compliance: 
A case study. Corporate Governance: An International Review 15: 101-111. 
 
Sullivan, M. 2007. Great migration: How recent events changed the switching behavior 
of top-tier audit clients. Working paper, The George Washington University. 
 
Villalonga, B. 2004. Does diversification cause the “Diversification discount”? Financial 
Management 33: 5-27. 
 
Whisenant, S., S. Sankaraguruswamy, and K. Raghunandan. 2003. Evidence on the joint 









Descriptive Statistics for Full Samples 
 











LnFeet         13.17           12.31        0.86*          13.25 12.34   0.91* 
LnFeet-1         12.53           12.24 0.29**          12.73 12.27   0.46* 
LnAssetst 4.27 3.56        0.71*            4.30   3.53   0.77* 
SqSegmentst 1.35 1.30        0.05  1.33   1.29  0.04 
Foreignt 0.15 0.16       -0.01            0.17   0.17  0.00 
InvRect 0.31 0.36       -0.05            0.31   0.35 -0.04 
Big4t 0.35 0.33        0.02            0.58   0.25   0.33* 
Initialt 0.11 0.14       -0.03            0.03   0.11   -0.08** 
Roat          -0.04            -0.10        0.06 -0.04  -0.23         0.19 
Losst 0.42 0.61       -0.19*            0.55   0.62        -0.07 
Liquidityt 2.87 4.18       -1.31  2.88   3.68        -0.80 
Casht-1 0.22 0.21        0.01  0.24   0.22 0.02 
NewDebtt-1 0.50 0.39        0.11***  0.52   0.36   0.16* 
Riskt-1 0.05 0.02        0.03  0.01   0.02        -0.01 
NewStockt-1 0.91 0.79        0.12**  0.92   0.76  0.16* 
Growtht-1 0.25 0.25        0.00  1.63   0.22         1.41* 
LnFloatt-1         17.59           16.67        0.92*          17.32 16.76         0.56* 
Observations         74         591             71          406  
        
*, **, *** Significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. All variables are defined in the Appendix. 






 TABLE 2 
Correlations 
 
Panel A:  Pearson Correlation Coefficients for 2006 
 
                  Sample includes 74 accelerated filers and 591 non-accelerated filers 
                   
 Acflrt LnFeet LnFeet-1 LnAssetst 
SqSeg- 
mentst







Acflrt   1.00                  
LnFeet   0.33*    1.00                 
LnFeet-1   0.12*    0.85*   1.00                
LnAssetst   0.19*    0.61*   0.59*   1.00               
SqSegmentst   0.03    0.22*   0.22*   0.06   1.00              
Foreignt  -0.01    0.21*   0.18*   0.06***   0.38*   1.00             
InvRect  -0.06   -0.04  -0.02   -0.04   0.09**   0.07***   1.00            
Big4t   0.02    0.43*   0.43*   0.31*   0.09**   0.10**  -0.16*  1.00           
Initialt  -0.03    0.01   0.06     0.01    0.02   0.08***   0.05 -0.06  1.00          
Roat   0.03    0.10*   0.09**   0.33*  -0.00  -0.03   0.17*  0.03  0.02  1.00         
Losst  -0.12*   -0.02   0.04  -0.27*   0.05*   0.00  -0.17* -0.05  0.01 -0.25*  1.00        
Liquidityt  -0.01   -0.09**  -0.08***  -0.02  -0.02  -0.02  -0.07*** -0.02 -0.02  0.00  0.03  1.00       
Casht-1   0.01   -0.07***  -0.07***  -0.28*   0.07***  -0.00  -0.46*  0.14* -0.08** -0.19*  0.20*  0.16*   1.00      
NewDebtt-1   0.07***    0.16*   0.20*    0.20*  -0.04  -0.02  -0.03  0.03  0.04  0.01  0.03 -0.05  -0.23*  1.00     
Riskt-1   0.06    0.02   0.02  -0.05   -0.06  -0.02  -0.14*  0.06 -0.04 -0.01  0.06*** -0.01   0.16* -0.06   1.00    
NewStockt-1   0.09**    0.16*   0.14*   0.02   0.10*   0.06  -0.05  0.08**  0.01  0.01  0.01  -0.07***   0.19*  0.02   0.08**   1.00   
Growtht-1  -0.00   -0.05  -0.07***  -0.09**  -0.07***  -0.07***  -0.05 -0.03  0.03 -0.04  0.08** -0.00   0.07***  0.01  -0.01   0.06 1.00  
LnFloatt-1   0.27*    0.35*   0.29*   0.36*   0.14*   0.10**  -0.18*  0.21* -0.06  0.01 -0.18*  -0.00   0.21*  -0.05   0.06   0.37* 0.05 1.00 
                   
  *, **, *** Significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  All variables are defined in the Appendix. 









Panel B:  Pearson Correlation Coefficients for 2007 
 
                 Sample includes 71 accelerated filers and 406 non-accelerated filers 
                   
 Acflrt LnFeet LnFeet-1 LnAssetst 
SqSeg- 
mentst







Acflrt   1.00                  
LnFeet   0.41*   1.00                 
LnFeet-1   0.22*   0.86*   1.00                
LnAssetst   0.25*   0.62*   0.57*   1.00               
SqSegmentst   0.03   0.20*   0.20*   0.08***   1.00              
Foreignt   0.00   0.10**   0.13*   0.02   0.38*  1.00             
InvRect  -0.07   0.01   0.00    0.04   0.09**  0.06  1.00            
Big4t   0.26*   0.49*   0.45*   0.34*   0.05  0.04 -0.12*   1.00           
Initialt  -0.10**  -0.11**  -0.04    -0.07    -0.03 -0.05  0.05  -0.09***  1.00          
Roat   0.05   0.17*   0.09**   0.43*   0.06  0.02  0.16*   0.07  0.01  1.00         
Losst  -0.05   0.05   0.11**  -0.22*  -0.00 -0.02 -0.18*  -0.05 -0.00 -0.18*   1.00        
Liquidityt  -0.02  -0.11**  -0.12**  -0.02  -0.02 -0.02 -0.09***  -0.02 -0.01  0.02   0.03   1.00       
Casht-1   0.04  -0.12*  -0.10**  -0.29*   0.04  0.03 -0.47*   0.12* -0.00 -0.18*   0.20*   0.23*   1.00      
NewDebtt-1   0.12*   0.12*   0.15*    0.15*  -0.05 -0.03 -0.03   0.01 -0.02 -0.02  -0.05  -0.07  -0.26*   1.00     
Riskt-1  -0.03   0.03   0.04  -0.04   -0.05  0.01 -0.10**   0.11** -0.00 -0.00   0.01  -0.01   0.13*  -0.09**   1.00    
NewStockt-1   0.14*   0.07   0.08***  -0.00   0.09**  0.09*** -0.05   0.09***  -0.10**  0.05  -0.06  -0.08***   0.11**   0.05 
  
0.08***   1.00   
Growtht-1   0.17*   0.03  -0.04  -0.01  -0.06 -0.03  0.01   0.06  0.02  0.02   0.07   0.00   0.08***  -0.01  -0.01   0.02 1.00  
LnFloatt-1   0.14*   0.17*   0.12**   0.14*   0.11**  0.07 -0.08***   0.13* -0.03  0.05  -0.09***   0.00   0.16*  -0.05   0.03   0.23* 0.07 1.00 
                   
  *, **, *** Significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  All variables are defined in the Appendix. 





Probit Model:  
The Likelihood of Being an Accelerated Filer
 
Acflrt = β0 + β1LnFeet-1 + β2LnAssetst + β3SqSegmentst + β4Foreignt +  β5InvRect + β6Big4t  + β7 
Initialt  
+  β8Roat  +  β9Losst + β10Liquidityt  +  β11Casht-1 + β12NewDebtt-1   +  β13Riskt-1         
+ β14NewStockt-1  +  β15Growtht-1 + β16LnFloatt-1  + ξ                                                                          
(1)                                                             
                Variable                                              Coefficients 
2006 Sample 2007 Sample 
Intercept -15.89* -6.35* 
LnFeet-1 -0.04 0.09 
LnAssetst     0.24**  0.34* 
SqSegmentst  0.05 0.02 
Foreignt -0.21 -0.09 
InvRect -0.06 -0.23 
Big4t   -0.34**    0.46** 
Initialt -0.13                       -0.45 
Roat -0.11  0.19 
Losst -0.17 -0.09 
Liquidityt -0.00 -0.02 
Casht-1  0.11  0.75 
NewDebtt-1      0.27***      0.30*** 
Riskt-1  0.40 -0.64 
NewStockt-1  0.21   0.67* 
Growtht-1 -0.01   0.15* 
LnFloatt-1   0.82*    0.12** 
      
Log likelihood                    -184.47                   -158.45 
LRχ2                       95.46                      84.46 
Observations                     665                    477 
Pseudo R2                         0.21 0.21 
   
*, **, *** Significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. All variables are defined in the Appendix. 
The results of the probit model are used to compute propensity scores, the estimated probability of being an 
accelerated filer. The results are also used to estimate the inverse Mills ratios, which are used in the audit fee 
regressions, model 2. 







Descriptive Statistics for Matched Samples 
 
  
2006 Means  
 













LnFeet         13.17          12.68   0.49*         13.27         12.72   0.55* 
LnFeet-1         12.53          12.59 -0.06         12.75         12.59  0.16 
LnAssetst 4.23 4.33 -0.10 4.32 4.28  0.04 
SqSegmentst 1.35 1.40 -0.05 1.34 1.28  0.06 
Foreignt 0.15 0.17 -0.02 0.17 0.07      0.10*** 
InvRect 0.31 0.32 -0.01 0.30 0.32 -0.02 
Big4t 0.37 0.45 -0.08 0.57 0.52  0.05 
Initialt 0.11 0.10  0.01 0.03 0.07 -0.04 
Roat          -0.04          -0.01 -0.03          -0.04 -0.08  0.04 
Losst 0.44 0.42  0.02 0.54 0.52  0.02 
Liquidityt 2.90 2.84  0.06 2.76 2.52  0.24 
Casht-1 0.22 0.23 -0.01 0.23 0.23  0.00 
NewDebtt-1 0.49 0.45  0.04 0.52 0.65 -0.13 
Riskt-1 0.06 0.06  0.00 0.01 0.01  0.00 
NewStockt-1 0.90 0.93 -0.03 0.91 0.93 -0.02 
Growtht-1 0.25 0.21  0.04 0.56 0.67 -0.11 
LnFloatt-1         17.57         17.57  0.00         17.31         17.26  0.05 
    Observations         71         71          69         69  
       
*, **, *** Significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. All variables are defined in the Appendix. 
The matched samples are created by matching each accelerated filer to the non-accelerated filer with the closest propensity score. 
The subscript i has been dropped from the variable names to simplify the exposition. 





Audit Fee Regressions Controlling for Selectivity 
 
LnFeet = α0j + α1jLnFeet-1 + α2jLnAssetst + α3jSqSegmentst + α4jForeignt  
+ α5jInvRect  + α6jBig4t + α7jInitialt + α8jRoat   + α9jLosst  +  α10jLiquidityt  
+ α11jIMRjt + εt                                                                                                    (2) 
 
Panel A: OLS Regression for Accelerated Filers (n=71)






Intercept 4.92    4.72* 4.05    3.88* 
LnFeet-1 0.70    8.43* 0.67    7.35* 
LnAssetst -0.04 -0.36 0.16     2.05** 
SqSegmentst -0.15 -1.14 -0.06  -0.58 
Foreignt 0.25   1.28 0.09   0.71 
InvRect 0.02   0.08 0.23   1.00 
Big4t 0.30     2.08** -0.01  -0.07 
Initialt -0.02 -0.11 -0.46  -1.50 
Roat -0.02 -0.13 0.20   0.97 
Losst 0.14  1.06 0.08   0.73 
Liquidityt -0.01 -0.79 0.01   0.67 
IMRA -0.26 -1.57 -0.03  -0.17 
Adjusted R2       0.76         0.76 
F-Statistic     20.90       20.57 
p-value       0.00         0.00 
     
Panel B: OLS Regression for Non-Accelerated Filers (n=69)






Intercept 2.62   3.23*  4.09    3.16* 
LnFeet-1 0.76          10.28*  0.60    4.87* 
LnAssetst 0.08 1.39  0.14       1.68*** 
SqSegmentst 0.07 0.85  0.23   1.64 
Foreignt 0.12 1.05 -0.04  -0.19 
InvRect 0.26 1.33  0.28   1.08 
Big4t -0.04          -0.44  0.17   1.26 
Initialt -0.00          -0.02  0.34   1.47 
Roat 0.27           1.23 -0.08  -0.43 
Losst -0.01          -0.10  0.06   0.42 
Liquidityt -0.01          -0.81 -0.08   -2.73* 
IMRNA  0.02           0.08 -0.25  -0.72 
 34 
 
Adjusted R2   0.84   0.67 
F-Statistic 33.57 13.70 
p-value   0.00   0.00 
 
*, **, *** Significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
IMRA is the inverse mills ratio for accelerated filers and IMRNA for non-accelerated filers. See the 
Appendix for definition of other variables. 









Summary Statistics for PremShare, Audit Fee Premium as a Share of Total Audit Fee 
  2006 2007 
Difference  
in Means         t-statistic Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test 
Mean 0.36 0.32   0.04                   -0.83   -0.89 (z-statistic) 
25% 0.24 0.15    
50% 0.42 0.37    
75% 0.56 0.51    
      
Observations 71 69     
     
PremShare is the Section 404 audit fee premium for an accelerated filer divided by the accelerated filer’s total 
audit fee.  












An indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm became an accelerated filer in year t and 
equals zero if the firm remained a non-accelerated filer (Audit Analytics) 
LnFeet The log of audit fee plus audit related fees (Audit Analytics) for current year 
 
 
Audit Fee Determinants 
 
Variable Description 
LnFeet-1 The natural log of the previous year’s audit fee plus audit related fee (Audit Analytics) 
LnAssetst The natural log of total assets for current year (Data6) (AT) 
SqSegmentst The square root of geographic segments during the current year (Compustat Segments) 
Foreignt 
A measure of foreign activity where an indicator variable equals1 if foreign currency gain 
or loss (Data150) (FCA) is non-zero during the current year, otherwise 0 
InvRect 
The ratio of inventory (Data3) (INVT) and receivables (Data2) (RECT) to total assets 
(Data6) (AT) for the current year 
Big4t 
An indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm is audited by a Big 4 auditor in the current year, 
otherwise 0 
Initialt 
An indicator variable equal to 1 if the auditor is in the first year of engagement, otherwise 
0 
Roat 
Return on assets for the current year, or operation income (Data178) (OIADP) to assets 
(Data6) (AT) 
Losst 
An indicator variable equal to 1 if net income (Data172) (NI) in current year or prior year 
is less than zero, otherwise 0 
Liquidityt The ratio of current assets (Data4) (ACT) to current liabilities (Data5) (LCT) 
  
  
Avoidance and Control Variables 
 
Variable Description 
Casht-1 Cash and short-term investments at the end of the prior year (Data1) (CHE) 
NewDebtt-1 
An indicator variable equal to 1 if company issued new debt in previous year (Data111) 
(DLTIS), otherwise 0  
Riskt-1 
An indicator variable equal to 1 if SIC code of 2833-2836, 3570-3577, 3600-3674, 5200-
5961, or 7370 in previous year, otherwise 0 
NewStockt-1 
An indicator variable equal to 1 if company issued new equity in previous year (Data108) 
(SSTK), otherwise 0  
Growtht-1 Growth in sales (Data12) (SALE) = (Salest-1 / Salest-2) -1 
LnFloatt-1 
The natural log of public float at the end of the 2nd quarter of the previous year, based on a 
review of 10-Ks 
 
 
 
 
